Parental consent and the deprivation of liberty of 16 and 17 year old children

On 26 September the Supreme Court gave judgement In the matter of D (A Child) [2019] UKSC 42. The case considers the scope of parental responsibility to consent to the living arrangements for children which would otherwise amount to a deprivation of liberty.

By way of background, D was born in 1999. He was diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, Asperger’s syndrome and Tourette’s syndrome, and has a mild learning disability. When he was 14 he was admitted to a hospital providing mental health services, for assessment and treatment. He lived in the hospital grounds and attended a school which was integral to the unit. The external door was locked and D was accompanied whenever he left the site. The hospital trust applied to the High Court for a declaration that it was lawful for the trust to deprive D of his liberty in this way. The judge, Mr Justice Keehan, held that D was so deprived but that it was a proper exercise of parental responsibility to consent to his constant supervision and control while he was under 16.

By then, with his parents’ agreement, and with Birmingham City Council (‘the Council’) accommodating him under s 20 Children Act 1989, D had been discharged from hospital to a residential placement, where he was similarly under constant supervision and not allowed to leave the premises except for a planned activity. On his 16th birthday proceedings were issued in the Court of Protection for a declaration that the consent of D’s parents meant that he was not deprived of his liberty at the placement. Keehan J held that his parents could no longer consent to what would otherwise be a deprivation of liberty once D had reached 16, and that the provisions of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (‘MCA’) now applied. He authorised the placement, and a subsequent transfer to another similar placement, as being in D’s best interests. When D reached the age of 18 his deprivation of liberty could be authorised under the deprivation of liberty safeguards in the MCA.

The Council appeal to the Court of Appeal on the ground that parents could consent to what would otherwise be a deprivation of liberty of a 16 or 17-year-old child who lacked the capacity to decide for himself, and the MCA had no bearing on this. The Official Solicitor on behalf of D then appealed that decision. The Supreme Court by a majority of 3 to 2 allowed the appeal.

Lady Hale who gave the lead judgement set out that the issue turns on the inter-relationship between the concept of parental responsibility and the obligation of the State to protect the human rights of children under the European Convention on Human Rights.

Parental responsibility being defined in the Children Act 1989 as “all the rights, duties, powers, responsibilities and authority which by law a parent of a child has in relation to the child and his property” (section 3(1)). “By law” obviously refers to the common law, but also includes those statutory provisions which give rights etc to parents, such as the Marriage Act 1949, which gives them the right to withhold consent to the marriage of a 16 or 17-year-old child (section 3).

She sets out that historically, parental rights under domestic common law were never absolute and became increasingly subject to the overriding consideration of the child’s own welfare. Quoting Lord Denning MR, In re Agar-Ellis (No 2) (1883) 24 Ch D 317, at 326:

“… the legal right of a parent to the custody of a child … is a dwindling right which the courts will hesitate to enforce against the wishes of the child, and the more so the older he is. It starts with a right of control and ends with little more than advice.”

She then considered the issue of ‘Gillick competence’ (Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech AHA [1986] 1 AC 112).  A case about whether it was lawful to give contraceptive advice and treatment to a child under 16 without her parent’s consent if she herself was capable of giving that consent. In that case the House of Lords concluded the earlier “age of discretion” cases had established the principle that children could achieve the capacity to make their own decisions before the age of majority. It was no longer, if it ever had been, correct to fix that at any particular age, rather than by reference to the capacity of the child in question.

Lady Hale commented that the MCA does not override other common law and statutory provisions relating to 16 and 17-year-old children, but it does indicate an appreciation of the different needs of this age group. She preferred to express her view on this issue by reference to the ECHR commenting; Article 5 ECHR protects children who lack the capacity to make decisions for themselves from being arbitrarily deprived of their liberty. Clearly the degree of supervision to which D was subject at the placements was not normal for a child of 16 or 17. D’s living arrangements had to be compared with those of children of the same age without disabilities, and the fact that they were made in his best interests did not mean he was not deprived of his liberty. Parental consent could not substitute for the subjective requirement under article 5 for valid consent to the deprivation.

She considered that the crux of the matter was whether the restrictions fall within normal parental control for a child of this age or do they not? If they do, they will not fall within the scope of article 5; but if they go beyond the normal parental control, article 5 will apply.

She concluded that Human rights are about the relationship between private persons and the state, and D’s deprivation of liberty in the placements was attributable to the state. There is no scope for the operation of parental responsibility to authorise what would otherwise be a violation of a fundamental human right of a child.

In her judgement, Lady Black considered that the Gillick case is not directly relevant to the issue before the court. It had to do with medical treatment and not with deprivation of liberty. It was concerned with whether a child might acquire the capacity, and the right, to make such decisions for herself before she reached the common law age of discretion, not with whether parental authority endured beyond that age if the child lacked the capacity to decide for herself. She was however careful to add “I do not intend in any way to water down the important changes brought about by Gillick or to alter the way in which it has been applied in many spheres of family law.”

Lady Black held however that as a matter of common law, parental responsibility for a child of 16 or 17 does not extend to authorising a confinement of the child in circumstances amounting to a deprivation of liberty.


William Hillier

Magdalen Chambers

October 2019

Court of Appeal Gives Judgment in Livewest v Bamber [2019] EWCA Civ 1174

The Court of Appeal has handed down judgment in Livewest v Bamber [2019] EWCA Civ 1174 – a case concerned with whether or not 6 months notice is required to end a fixed term tenancy by the use of a break clause.

In February 2017 Miss Bamber was granted a fixed term assured shorthold tenancy for 7 years of residential premises. That tenancy contained a break clause that Livewest were entitled under the terms of the tenancy to exercise at any time during the starter period, which was an initial period of 12 months capable of extension for a further 6 months (giving a total potential starter period of 18 months).

During the starter period Livewest exercised the break clause due to allegations of anti social behaviour and served a two month notice that complied with section 21(1) of the Housing Act 1988 and the conditions for the exercise of the break clause in the tenancy.

The issue on this appeal was whether or not sections 21(1A) and 21(1B) of the Housing Act 1988, which were introduced by the Localism Act 2011, meant that a six month notice had to be served. Section 21(1A) of the Housing Act 1988 states that section 21(1B) of the Housing Act 1988 applies to an assured shorthold tenancy if “it is a fixed term tenancy for a term certain of not less than two years” and “the landlord is a private registered provider of social housing.” The argument of Miss Bamber was that these conditions were both fulfilled and therefore the effect of section 21(1B) of the Housing Act 1988 was that a six month notice was required.

In the High Court ([2018] EWHC 2454) Miss Bamber’s argument was rejected on the basis that at the time the court came to consider the case the tenancy was no longer a fixed term tenancy for a term certain of not less than two years and therefore the first condition in section 21(1A) of the Housing Act 1988 was not satisfied. The Court of Appeal (at paragraph 42) agree that this analysis cannot be correct as this would be to render the provisions of no effect – by the time the court comes to consider a tenancy in any case it cannot still be a fixed term tenancy. However, the Court of Appeal took the view that a purposive and restrictive approach should be taken towards the word “expiry” in section 21(1B) of the Housing Act 1988 with the effect that this should be read as meaning expiry by the effluxion of time only in this context. This means that the requirement to serve a six month notice only applies where the tenancy in question is being brought to an end by the effluxion of time and therefore does not apply where a break clause is being exercised.

An additional issue that is briefly mentioned in this appeal is whether or not, in cases where section 21(1B) of the Housing Act 1988 does apply, the 6 month notice must be served before or at the end of the fixed term tenancy in order to have effect. Whilst Patten LJ offered a provisional obiter view on this all three members of the Court of Appeal have left this issue to be decided in a future case where the point is of direct application.

A copy of the full judgment can be found here:


Miss Bamber was represented throughout by Russell James of Magdalen Chambers and Cathy Morley of Shelter (Plymouth).

David Campbell acts as Prosecutor for A.C.T National Health and Safety Criminal Mock Trial

On Wednesday 13th February David Campbell acted as Prosecution Counsel for Compliance on Trial – Health and Safety  Criminal Mock Trial he helped organise with A.C.T National Ltd at the National Liberal Club in London.

The event was attended by over 70 delegates who became the Jury and were actively involved in the Judgment with the aim of this trial was to provide knowledge of the process when a criminal trial is brought to court.

It was not designed to teach law or how to conduct an investigation, but to provide a valuable insight into both the legal and prosecution process that are taken.

Being run by practicing criminal barristers, this event provides a very realistic view of the legal requirements involving working at height undertakings and the due diligence / liability process in utilising contractors.

The event closed with a discussion of the verdict and its implications, with opportunity to question the legal team and network with fellow professionals.

Pimlico Plumbers Ltd & Mullins v Smith [2018] UKSC 29

In what is likely to be the leading authority on employment status for years to come, the Supreme Court today has dismissed the appeal of Pimlico Plumbers from the Court of Appeal decision that Mr Smith was a worker and not a self-employed contractor.

Mr Smith is a plumber who carried out work for Pimlico between 2005 and 2011. After suffering a heart attack in 2011, Mr Smith claimed to have been unfairly dismissed despite having presented himself as self-employed for VAT and income tax for 6 years. The facts of his engagement are complex, but the dispute between the parties centred around the legal categorisation of Pimlico’s business model. The model presented operatives to clients as working for the business, but at the same time the business internally sought to maintain that there was a legal relationship of self-employed independent contractor rather than employer and employee. The paperwork in this regard was confusing at best. The employment tribunal, EAT and Court of Appeal all reached the decision that Mr Smith was a ‘worker’ rather than a self-employed contractor. Today the Supreme Court judgment upheld that finding.

Whether or not someone is a worker or an employee is largely a matter of fact for the Tribunal to decide. Here Lord Wilson determined that, “the dominant feature of Mr Smith’s contracts with Pimlico was an obligation of personal performance …there were features of the contract which strongly militated against recognition of Pimlico as a client or customer of Mr Smith. Its tight control over him was reflected in its requirements that he should wear the branded Pimlico uniform; drive its branded van, to which Pimlico applied a tracker; carry its identity card; and closely follow the administrative instructions of its control room. The severe terms as to when and how much it was obliged to pay him, on which it relied, betrayed a grip on his economy inconsistent with his being a truly independent contractor.” The substantive claims will now proceed to be heard in the employment tribunal.

Although Charlie Mullins (the owner of Pimlico) prophesies that companies using self-employed contractors now face a ‘tsunami of claims’, this claim is most likely a gross exaggeration. As has always been the case, every individual case will require careful legal analysis of the true nature of the working relationship. The contractual label alone is not enough. The contract may term the relationship as one of self-employed contractor, but the substance of the obligation of personal performance is what counts. Here, there was criticism of “an irrelevant contract, cast in highly confusing terms”, necessitating proper scrutiny of the entire engagement. The famous judgment of Lord Templeman in Street v Mountford [1985] AC 809 comes to mind that “The manufacture of a five pronged implement for manual digging results in a fork even if the manufacturer, unfamiliar with the English language, insists that he intended to make and has made a spade.”

Companies routinely engaging self-employed contractors on any sort of routine basis would do well to potentially scrutinise and revise its contracts in light of this judgment. Individuals who feel as though they have been ‘strong armed’ into signing a contract declaring them to be self-employed, despite being heavily controlled by their company, may wish to consider negotiating a clearer and more honest working legal relationship. When it comes to drafting contracts that seek to control an operative whilst describing them as self-employed, the ‘careful choreography’ exercised by Pimlico is not enough to balance such inconsistent objectives. In future, contracts- be they for an employee, worker or self-employed contractor- should really call a spade a spade.

Andrew Worthley

Fundamental Dishonesty in Context – LOCOG v Sinfield [2018] EWHC 51

In the absence of an authoritative statutory definition, a fair amount of judicial ink has been spent attempting to unpack the practical meaning of the term ‘fundamental dishonesty’. It was introduced by CPR 44.16(4) as an exception to the qualified one-way costs shifting (QOCS) provisions in CPR 44.14 and has since been employed in the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015. The Court of Appeal in Howlett v Davies [2017] EWCA Civ 1696 (on which see Russell James’ 2017 article) endorsed the approach of HHJ Moloney QC in the unreported case of Gosling v Hailo (29 April 2014) on the meaning of the term in the QOCS context. An important element of that guidance is an explicit distinction between dishonesty relating to issues that are ‘fundamental’ and those that are merely ‘incidental’ to the claim.

Relatively few findings of fundamental dishonesty have been made at all and, although a general taxonomy is helpful, discussion of this vexed expression against different factual and legal backgrounds renders its meaning clearer and application simpler. In this context, the recent case of LOCOG v Sinfield [2018] EWHC 51, which is the first reported case on the concept in relation to section 57 of the 2015 Act is a helpful addition to the emerging definition.  Section 57 provides in part:

57 Personal Injury Claims: Cases of Fundamental Dishonesty

(1) This section applies where, in proceedings on a claim for damages in respect of personal injury (“the primary claim”)—

(a) the court finds that the claimant is entitled to damages in respect of the claim, but

(b) on an application by the defendant for the dismissal of the claim under this section, the court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the claimant has been fundamentally dishonest in relation to the primary claim or a related claim.

(2) The court must dismiss the primary claim, unless it is satisfied that the claimant would suffer substantial injustice if the claim were dismissed.

(3) The duty under subsection (2) includes the dismissal of any element of the primary claim in respect of which the claimant has not been dishonest.

The case concerned a volunteer at the 2012 Olympic Games who injured his arm and wrist; the Defendants admitted liability. Following a trial on quantum, LOCOG served an amended defence which alleged fundamental dishonesty.

The Claimant claimed that the injury prevented him from tending to his two-acre garden which he said he and his wife had used to look after alone but for which they now required a gardener. The amount claimed in this respect was ~£14,000 which represented ~42% of total damages. It emerged that the Claimant had employed a gardener before the accident (who had taken on no more work since the accident) and that additional invoices, purportedly from the gardener, were in fact drawn up by the Claimant himself (his ex post facto excuse was that this was ‘self-billing’).

At first instance, the judge rejected the section 57 application, finding that the Claimant had been “muddled, confused and careless” in making the inflated claim and, in relation to the creation of false invoices, had been “dishonest”. Crucially, however, he had not been fundamentally dishonest so as to affect the entirety of the claim.

Allowing LOCOG’s appeal, Knowles J took Howlett and QOCS caselaw as his starting point for his discussion on fundamental dishonesty. This discussion is useful for three reasons:

  1. it provides a practical example of fundamental dishonesty;
  2. it clarifies the narrow difference between the two uses of the term; and
  3. it outlines the proper approach to be taken to an application under section 57.

Firstly, it was found clear that this was an example of ‘dishonest’ behaviour. Dishonesty is not a particularly controversial concept and imports the well-understood concepts of falsity, deceit and deception. In Ivey v Genting Casinos [2017] 3 WLR 1212 the criminal standard of dishonesty was modified to be more objective, the civil test now being for the court to consider, as a matter of fact: what the Claimant’s words meant and whether the Claimant could have genuinely believed that meaning.

The court also noted that even in the context of a claim for gardening assistance ~42% of the damages was sufficiently ‘fundamental’. What fundamental actually means however still remains something of a mystery. The judgment brings together existing signposts on fundamentality: the Howlett approach was applied and the judge considered the proportion of the damages affected was more than incidental; the definition of ‘fundamental’ breach of contract discussed by Lord Upjohn in Suisse Atlantique [1967] 1 AC 361 is also drawn on (breaches that go “to the root” of the contract). However, the judgment does not go much further than canvassing these authorities and applying them to the present facts in actually clarifying the concept of fundamentality for the purposes of personal injury litigation.

Secondly, the decision compares the usage of the term fundamental dishonesty in relation to QOCS and section 57. At paragraph 60:

60 …the drafter of s 57 sought to draw several distinctions from CPR r 44.16: it is the claimant who the court must find dishonest, rather than the claim. Further, rather than permitting the defendant to recover all of his costs, the court is required to assess the claimant’s ‘genuine’ damages and deduct that figure from the defendant’s costs. As to the first point, however, it will be rare for a claim to be fundamentally dishonest without the claimant also being fundamentally dishonest, although that might be a theoretical possibility, at least.

On the basis of that dictum, it appears that practitioners should not be reluctant to draw on QOCS caselaw when considering the term in the section 57 context and vice versa. Whether there could be a case where a Claimant is fundamentally dishonest but that dishonesty does not infect his claim remains to be seen.

Finally, at paragraph 64, the judge neatly summarises the correct approach:

64 Where an application is made by a defendant for the dismissal of a claim under s 57 the court should:

a. Firstly, consider whether the claimant is entitled to damages in respect of the claim. If he concludes that the claimant is not so entitled, that is the end of the matter, although the judge may have to go on to consider whether to disapply QOCS pursuant to CPR r 44.16 

b.If the judge concludes that the claimant is entitled to damages, the judge must determine whether the defendant has proved to the civil standard that the claimant has been fundamentally dishonest in relation to the primary claim and/or a related claim in the sense that I have explained.

c.If the judge is so satisfied then the judge must dismiss the claim including, by virtue of s 57(3), any element of the primary claim in respect of which the claimant has not been dishonest unless, in accordance with s 57(2), the judge is satisfied that the claimant would suffer substantial injustice if the claim were dismissed.

In addition to this, Knowles J addressed a finding that the judge below had made: that it would be substantially unjust for the entire claim to be dismissed when the dishonesty related only to a peripheral part of the claim. In paragraph 65 he dismisses this, noting that it was Parliament’s intention that section 57(3) “…be punitive and…operate as a deterrent” and that a ruling which effectively allowed fundamentally dishonest claimants to keep the “honest” portion of their damages “would effectively neuter” the effect of that subsection.

Overall, the first case to discuss fundamental dishonesty in the section 57 context sensibly draws on and contributes to the emerging judicial understanding of the term. It provides guidance on the approach to be adopted which, with further application, will help bring much-needed clarity to this important area.

20.02.18 – Charles Shwenn


Unmarried couples win right to claim bereavement damages following landmark ruling 

Unmarried couples are to have the same rights to bereavement damages as married couples following a landmark Court of Appeal ruling.

NHS worker Jakki Smith, 59, brought an appeal after discovering she was not eligible for damages after her partner John Bulloch died in 2011.


Burden of Proof under the Equality Act 2010: Ayodele v Citylink Limited & Napier [EWCA] Civ 1913 a Return to Orthodoxy after Efobi v Royal Mail Limited.

Further to my article on 9th October 2017 the Court of Appeal has considered the effect of section 136 of the Equality Act 2010 in the case of Ayodele v Citylink Ltd. The point arose as an additional ground of appeal before the Court of Appeal as a consequence of the EAT’s decision in Efobi.
Their Lordships considered not only the well-known, pre-Efobi, domestic law on this point but also the Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi in CJEU case C-415/10 Galina Meister v Speech Design Carrier Systems GmbH, which supported the view that in EU law the initial burden lies on a claimant and that this maintains a fair balance between the rights of claimants and those of defendants or respondents.
Singh LJ at paragraph 93 of his Judgment in Ayodele said “I can see no reason in fairness why a respondent should have to discharge that burden of proof unless and until the claimant has shown that there is a prima facie case of discrimination which needs to be answered” Singh LJ was reinforced in that view by reason of the Opinion of the Advocate General in Galina Meister. Further comment was made that there was no material before the Court of Appeal that tended to show that there was a mischief that Parliament intended to remedy by the altered wording in Section 136. It was concluded that the change in wording was because the earlier legislation was not entirely clear that what should be considered at the first stage was all the evidence, from whatever source it had come, and not only the evidence adduced by the claimant. This had been clarified by the Court of Appeal in Madarassy. The changing of the wording was a “tidying up” exercise and not intended to change the law in substance. It was concluded that the pre-Efobi decisions of the Court of Appeal remained good law and that the interpretation in Efobi is wrong and should not be followed.
There is, however, an important point still to be drawn from Efobi, namely the clear warning given to Respondents of the possibility that an adverse inference might be drawn if they do not call alleged discriminators, without a good explanation, to give evidence.
It should be noted that the Court of Appeal has not determined whether permission to appeal should be granted in Efobi and as such there may be further developments.

The Court of Appeal Gives Judgment in Fundamental Dishonesty Case

On Monday 30 October 2017 the Court of Appeal gave judgment in the case of Howlett v Davies [2017] EWCA Civ 1696, which concerned the issue of fundamental dishonesty for the purpose of removing the costs protection provided by Qualified One Way Costs Shifting (‘QOCS’). Rule 44.16 of the Civil Procedure Rules provides the exceptions to the costs protection provided by QOCS and specifically provides in relation to fundamental dishonesty as follows: “Orders for costs made against the claimant may be enforced to the full extent of such orders with the permission of the court where the claim is found on the balance of probability to be fundamentally dishonest.”

The facts of the case are of limited relevance but in brief concerned a claim by a mother and son that they had been passengers in a vehicle that had reversed into another stationary vehicle. They alleged that they had suffered injury and sued the driver of the vehicle they claimed to have been a passenger in. The driver of the vehicle they were in also gave evidence supporting the case of Mrs Howlett and her son.

At the start of the trial counsel for the Howletts attempted to get the defence struck out on the ground that the defendant insurers should either allege fraud (which they didn’t) or accept that the accident occurred as alleged with the consequential injuries. It was contended that the Howletts “should not be allowed to sit on the fence”. The application to strike out was dismissed and the fast track trial (taking 4 days) proceeded. At the conclusion of the trial the deputy district judge found that there was fundamental dishonesty, dismissed the claims and allowed the defendant insurer to enforce their costs. The Howletts appealed firstly to HHJ Blair QC who dismissed their appeal and then secondly to the Court of Appeal resulting in this judgment.

2 principal points of importance arise out of this decision of the Court of Appeal (judgment of Newey LJ with whom LJJ Lewison and Beatson agree).

Firstly, the Court of Appeal approve the meaning of fundamental dishonesty given by HHJ Moloney in the County Court decision of Gosling v Hailo (2014) in which he said:

“It appears to me that when one looks at the matter in that way, one sees that what the rules are doing is distinguishing between two levels of dishonesty: dishonesty in relation to the claim which is not fundamental so as to expose such a claimant to costs liability, and dishonesty which is fundamental, so as to give rise to costs liability.

The corollary term to ‘fundamental’ would be a word with some such meaning as ‘incidental’ or ‘collateral’. Thus, a claimant should not be exposed to costs liability merely because he is shown to have been dishonest as to some collateral matter or perhaps as to some minor, self-contained head of damage. If, on the other hand, the dishonesty went to the root of either the whole of his claim or a substantial part of his claim, then it appears to me that it would be a fundamentally dishonest claim: a claim which depended as to a substantial or important part of itself upon dishonesty.”

Secondly, the Court of Appeal dealt with the main issue in this case, which was whether or not a defendant insurer had to expressly plead fundamental dishonesty in order for there to be such a finding. This was answered in the negative with Newey LJ stating as follows:

“I do not think an insurer need necessarily have alleged in its defence that the claim was “fundamentally dishonest” for one-way costs shifting to be displaced on that ground. Where findings properly made in the trial judge’s judgment on the substantive claim warrant the conclusion that it was “fundamentally dishonest”, an insurer can, I think, invoke CPR 44.16(1) regardless of whether there was any reference to fundamental dishonesty in its pleadings.” (Paragraph 32).

This news article is written by Russell James of Magdalen Chambers who appeared earlier this year in a successful County Court appeal on a fundamental dishonesty point

Dan Dyson Led by Neil Hext QC succeeds in Court of Appeal


The Court of Appeal has held that a negligent broker who failed to place PI insurance for his accountant client had caused no loss as the notional insurer would not have accepted the claim made by the accountant due to the particular facts underlying his claim.  The judgment can be read here:

In particular Lord Justice Tomlinson considered that:

“The insurers would, as the judge found, have recognised that the investors had been advised to “shoehorn their commercial claim against MHP into a professional negligence claim in order to tap into Mr Channon’s PII cover”. The pithy but apt language is again that of Mr Dyson.” (para 40)

In addition to the central issues in the appeal, the Court of Appeal also considered circumstances in which parties to a settlement cap a Defendant’s liability for the purposes of that settlement only to subsequently obtain a judgment by consent in excess of that amount (see in particular paragraph 17).

The appeal follows on from Dan Dyson’s successful first instance result at trial see: Channon v Ward [2015] EWHC 4256 (QB) which can be read here:

Dan Dyson has a broad commercial practice including property matters.

Dan Dyson appears before the Court of Appeal

Dan Dyson led by Neil Hext QC of 4 New Square Chambers appeared before the Court of Appeal (Lady Justice Gloster and Lord Justice Tomlinson) on 22 and 23 November 2016 in the case of Rodney Channon (t/a Channon & Co) v John Ward (t/a Channon & Co).  Judgment will be handed down in due course.

At trial in the High Court (Exeter District Registry) Dan had succeeded in establishing that despite his insurance broker’s negligence in failing to renew his accountant client’s PI cover, quantum against him should be assessed at nil.  The claim against the insurance broker arose after his accountant client had received a number of claims made by investors of a property development company that the accountant managed and owned.  All the investors had invested in the property development company by making unsecured loans.  The loans were not repaid so substantial sums were lost by the investors.  Claims were issued against the accountant alleging that he had given negligent advice qua accountant.  However, HHJ Cotter QC decided that the accountant had not been acting qua accountant so that no accountant’s policy would have operated to provide an indemnity and/or that certain exceptions in the putative policy would have meant that no cover would have been provided – had any insurer been on risk.

Accordingly, the appeal covered matters of: loss of chance; construction of exceptions to an accountant’s policy and their exceptions as supported by the ICAEW’s Approved Policy Wording (a policy wording formulated and/or agreed by the accountant’s governing body). As well as how impecuniosity might be a matter of remoteness in contract.