Parental Responsibility and Declarations of Non-Parentage:
A Non-Biological Father Named on a Clild’s Birth Certificate

Parental responsibility is a concept applicable to all private and public law children cases, but what happens when a non-biological father has acquired parental responsibility by being named on the birth certificate as the child’s father? There are circumstances in which the mother names her partner on her child’s birth certificate in the knowledge that they are not the child’s biological father, which will lead to him acquiring parental responsibility for the child – but what happens if the mother and her partner separate, and she no longer wants him to have the legal rights and parental responsibility for her child? Or what happens if she does not oppose her now ex-partner retaining parental responsibility if he has raised the child as his own as the child’s ‘psychological/emotional parent’ – does it remain correct as a matter of law that he should retain parental responsibility for the child?

Case study:

Jennifer was recently instructed on a case in which the mother and X were married at the time of Y’s birth. The mother and X knew that Y was not X’s biological child as the parties re-commenced their relationship shortly following Y’s conception and X had undergone a vasectomy prior to his relationship with the mother. The parties had previously been in a relationship for several years but separated for a short period before the relationship re-commenced and they married later that year. The mother knew who the biological father to X was (‘Z’), but both Z and the mother were unaware that she was pregnant upon their separation and Z was not told of Y’s birth. The mother and Z had a short relationship during her separation from X.The mother and X were married at the time of Y’s birth, and they registered Y’s birth naming X as the biological father. X therefore acquired parental responsibility for Y. X raised Y as his own child until the parties’ separation when Y was 3 months’ old. Y had been raised believing X to be their father and was 10 months’ old when the court proceedings commenced. Y was 2 years old when the proceedings concluded. 

Following separation, the mother and X shared care of Y. There was a period of time during which the mother stopped contact due to welfare concerns and X issued court proceedings with an application for a Child Arrangements Order to confirm with whom Y should live and the time Y should spend with the other party. X stated that the mother had stopped his contact with Y and was refusing to send him any updates about Y. 

During the proceedings X’s contact with Y re-commenced by agreement initially on two occasions mid-week. This then progressed by agreement to alternate weekends and then every weekend Friday to Sunday (prior to the Guardian’s appointment). The mother confirmed during the Cafcass safeguarding process and the subsequent section 7 report that she sought for X to be removed from Y’s birth certificate. This was opposed by X and the court appointed a 16.4 Guardian. 

A DWP was unsuccessful in locating Z and all reasonable steps were taken during the proceedings to locate him. DNA testing was undertaken during the proceedings which confirmed that X was not Y’s biological father. The Guardian made an application for a Declaration of Non-Parentage so that Y’s birth could be re-registered to confirm that X was not Y’s biological father. The mother supported the application, but X opposed on the basis that he was Y’s psychological father.

X’s position for the final hearing was to seek an order that (a) Y should spend every Friday from school until Sunday afternoon with him and (b) X and the mother should share the school holidays equally with the specific arrangements to be agreed as and when. The mother was in agreement with X’s proposal. The Guardian did not consider an every week ‘spend time with’ order to be sustainable, especially when Y started school. The Guardian recommended a Child Arrangements Order setting out the minimum level of contact per month; the Guardian proposed every other weekend Friday to Sunday and for the mother and X to be at liberty to agree any further contact. The Guardian also supported the making of a ‘live with’ order to the mother.

The parties agreed the making of a ‘live with’ order to the mother and the terms of the ‘spend time with’ order as recommended by the Guardian prior to the final hearing. The only outstanding issue for the final hearing was the Guardian’s application for a Declaration of Non-Parentage. The court agreed that there appeared to be a ‘grey area’ in the law in respect of the impact, if any, on X’s parental responsibility if a Declaration of Non-Parentage was made in circumstances where a child’s birth is registered when the mother and her partner were married, and whether the Declaration would lead to the automatic removal of X’s parental responsibility for Y or whether a court order would be required if his parental responsibility was to be removed or restricted. The court agreed that section 4(2A) of the Children Act 1989 only applies to circumstances in which the mother and the ‘father’ were not married at the time of the registration of the child’s birth. The court took the view that (a) if the removal of parental responsibility is not automatic on the making of a Declaration of Non-Parentage in circumstances in which the mother and the ‘father’ were not married (pursuant to section 4(2A) of the Children Act 1989), it is unlikely that statue intended that the removal of parental responsibility is automatic on the making of a Declaration of Non-Parentage in circumstances in which the mother and the ‘father’ were married, and (b) therefore an order would need to be made if there was to be removal or restriction to X’s parental responsibility. The Guardian and the mother initially sought the removal (if possible) or restriction (at least) of X’s parental responsibility, which was opposed by X. The court also acknowledged that (a) the court noting that orders to remove parental responsibility or to restrict a person’s exercise of parental responsibility are only made in exceptional circumstances (as per P v D [2014] EWHC 2355 (Fam)) and (b) section 4(2A) did not apply to the circumstances of this case and there was no statutory provision applicable to this case permitting an order to remove parental responsibility (see below). 

The court directed the Guardian and/or the mother to file any application to remove or restrict X’s parental responsibility and statements from the parties and a further hearing was listed. 

At the final hearing, X no longer opposed the making of a Declaration of Non-Parentage. The Guardian nor the mother wished to pursue an application to restrict X’s exercise of parental responsibility for Y. In making the application for a Declaration of Non-Parentage the Guardian confirmed that they were not seeking to undermine the role that X has in Y’s life, that X’s relationship with Y is promoted through regular contact, and that this order is correcting a legal document on the basis that this is in Y’s best interests. The court considered that (a) within the meaning of Family Law Act 1986, section 55A(3) and (4), the Guardian (as the applicant) had sufficient interest in the determination of this application to justify making the application, (b) the jurisdiction requirements set out in Family Law Act 1986, section 55A(2) had been satisfied and (c) the court had not considered it necessary to direct that the papers in the case should be sent to the Attorney-General to allow him to intervene and make representations in the proceedings pursuant to Family Law Act 1986, section 59.

Declaration of Non-Parentage was therefore made. 

The law:

Naming someone on a birth certificate as a child’s father in the knowledge that they are not the child’s biological father amounts to paternity fraud as a birth certificate is a legal document and it is signed on the basis that the contents of the document are true to the best of the informant’s knowledge and belief (i.e., that the person named as the father is the biological father). If a person is married to the mother at the time of the child’s birth he would be presumed as a matter of common law to be the child’s biological father. However, this common law presumption is rebuttable and is displaced in the circumstances where the mother and her husband know at the time of the child’s birth that her husband is not the biological father.  

Statute does not define ‘father’. Upon a reading of the law, a man can become a ‘father’ either (a) because of being the biological father or (b) by gaining parenting responsibility and therefore becoming a legal father (in that he has a legal right towards the child and his/her upbringing). As a matter of law, a biological father is not automatically considered a legal father and does not automatically have parental responsibility, he must acquire parental responsibility by way of (a) being married to the mother at the time of the child’s birth, (b) be named on the birth certificate or (c) have been granted parental responsibility by an order of the court.

In the circumstances of the case study, whilst X was not be Y’s biological father, he was Y’s legal father due to being named on Y’s birth certificate. 

The concept of parental responsibility and the law applicable to parental responsibility is set out at sections 2-4A of the Children Act 1989.

Pursuant to section 2(1) of the Children Act 1989, 

  1. Where a child’s father and mother were married to, or civil partners of, each other at the time of his birth, they shall each have parental responsibility for the child
  2. Where a child’s father and mother were not married to, or civil partners of, each other at the time of his birth—
    1. the mother shall have parental responsibility for the child;
    2. the father shall have parental responsibility for the child if he has acquired it (and has not ceased to have it) in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

Pursuant to section 4 of the Children Act 1989:

  1. Where a child’s father and mother were not married to, or civil partners of, each other at the time of his birth, the father shall acquire parental responsibility for the child if —
    1. he becomes registered as the child’s father under any of the enactments specified in subsection (1A);
    2. he and the child’s mother make an agreement (a “parental responsibility agreement”) providing for him to have parental responsibility for the child; or
    3. the court, on his application, orders that he shall have parental responsibility for the child.
  2. A person who has acquired parental responsibility under subsection (1) shall cease to have that responsibility only if the court so orders.

Pursuant to section 4A of the Children Act 1989:

  1. Where a child’s parent (“parent A”) who has parental responsibility for the child is married to, or a civil partner of, a person who is not the child’s parent (“the step-parent”)—
    1. parent A or, if the other parent of the child also has parental responsibility for the child, both parents may by agreement with the step-parent provide for the step-parent to have parental responsibility for the child; or
    2. the court may, on the application of the step-parent, order that the step-parent shall have parental responsibility for the child.

The court may also make ‘Declarations of Parentage’ (i.e., that X is the father of Y) and ‘Declarations of Non-Parentage’ (that X is not the father of Y) pursuant to the Family Law Act 1986. According to section 55A:

  1. Subject to the following provisions of this section, any person may apply to the High Court or the family court for a declaration as to whether or not a person named in the application is or was the parent of another person so named.
  2. A court shall have jurisdiction to entertain an application under subsection (1) above if, and only if, either of the persons named in it for the purposes of that subsection –
    1. is domiciled in England and Wales on the date of the application, or
  3. Except in a case falling within subsection (4) below, the court shall refuse to hear an application under subsection (1) above unless it considers that the applicant has a sufficient personal interest in the determination of the application (but this is subject to section 27 of the Child Support Act 1991).
  4. The excepted cases are where the declaration sought is as to whether or not –
    1. the applicant is the parent of a named person;
    2. a named person is the parent of the applicant; or
    3. a named person is the other parent of a named child of the applicant.
  5. Where an application under subsection (1) above is made and one of the persons named in it for the purposes of that subsection is a child, the court may refuse to hear the application if it considers that the determination of the application would not be in the best interests of the child.
  6. Where a declaration is made by a court on an application under subsection (1) above, the prescribed officer of the court shall notify the Registrar General, in such a manner and within such period as may be prescribed, of the making of that declaration.

Pursuant to section 58 of the FLA 1986:

  1.  Where on an application to a court for a declaration under this Part the truth of the proposition to be declared is proved to the satisfaction of the court, the court shall make that declaration unless to do so would manifestly be contrary to public policy.
  2. Any declaration made under this Part shall be binding on Her Majesty and all other persons.
  3. A court, on the dismissal of an application for a declaration under this Part, shall not have power to make any declaration for which an application has not been made.
  4. No declaration which may be applied for under this Part may be made otherwise than under this Part by any court.

As per Mr Justice MacDonald in H v An Adoption Agency (Declaration of Parentage Following Adoption) [2020] EWFC 74 (para 24):

‘Within this context, it is also important to recall that as Black LJ (as she then was) noted in Re S (A Child)(Declaration of Parentage) [2012] All ER (D) 140 at [24] and [37], the question of parentage is a question that concerns more than just the individuals involved in a specific case, stating at [24] that:

“[24] Issues of status, such as parentage, can be expected to be approached with some formality. They concern not only the individual but also the public generally which has an interest in the status of an individual being spelled out accurately and in clear terms and recorded in properly maintained records.”

Mr Justice MacDonald also stated that:

‘Section 55A(1) of the Family Law Act 1986 deals with the identity of a child’s parent as a matter of fact…on an application under Part III of the Act for a declaration of status, the court is concerned with proof of matters of fact. A declaration as to status made under Part III of the Family Law Act 1986 is intended to be an authoritative statement of the fact so declared. Within this context, the term ‘parent’ in s 55A(1) of the Family Law Act 1986 refers to someone who is a parent of the child as a matter of fact’ (para 45); and

…

‘As I observed in MS v RS (Paternity) [2020] 2 FLR 689 [45], there is a further relevant factor in determining pursuant to s 55A(5) of the 1986 Act whether it is in a child’s best interests to hear an application for a declaration of parentage:

“[45] In considering whether it can be said that to hear the application is not in the children’s best interests (and further highlighting why facts justifying such a conclusion will generally, but not always be radical in nature) the right of the child to know, and the importance of the child knowing his or her paternity is a factor that must also be weighed in the balance, subject to the matters set out above.” (para 66)

In A Local Authority v SB & Ors [2022] EWFC 111, the court stated at paragraphs 5-6:

‘I have been referred to the dicta of Munby J in Re X (A child) 2016 EWHC 1342 (Fam) where he said at para 18:

“I agree with the guardian. X has a right (I put the matter descriptively rather than definitively) to know the truth about his past and about his birth parents. This has long been recognised in our domestic law. In S & Mc (otherwise S) and M (DS Intervener), W v W [1972] AC24, 57 Lord Hodson, in the context of disputed paternity said that:

“The interests of justice in the abstract are best served by the ascertainment of the truth and there must be few cases where the interests of children can be shown to be best served by the suppression of the truth”

In re H (a minor) (Blood Tests: Parental Rights) [1997] Fam 89, 106, Ward LJ said apropos paternity every child has a right to know the truth unless his welfare clearly justifies the coverup.

To the same effect in Re H and A (Paternity: Blood Tests) [2022] EWCA Civ 383 [2002] 1 FLR 1145 para 29, Thorpe LJ identified one of the principles to be drawn from the authorities as being that the interests of justice are best served by the ascertainment of the truth”

It has not been suggested that this is one of those unusual cases where I should decline to make the declaration notwithstanding the compelling evidence’

As per Sir Andrew McFarlane P in Re A (Parental Responsibility) [2023] EWCA Civ 689:

‘The focus of the present appeal is upon the distinction that is made within the Children Act 1989 [‘CA 1989’] between married and unmarried parents with respect to the court’s power to revoke parental responsibility. In short, where parents are married or are in a civil partnership, there is no power to revoke the parental responsibility of a father or second female parent. That position is in contrast to unmarried fathers, unmarried second female parents or step-parents where, by CA 1989, ss 4(2A), 4ZA(5) or 4A(3) respectively, the court has the power to bring their parental responsibility to an end’ (para 1)

‘The parental responsibility of any person is, however, extinguished by adoption [Adoption and Children Act 2002, s 46(2)’ (para 8)

‘Irrespective of whether or not there is a statutory power to bring parental responsibility to an end, in every case the court may control and limit a parent’s ability to exercise parental responsibility through the making of prohibited steps orders, and may enhance the ability of the other parent to exercise parental responsibility with respect to specific issues… Whilst a prohibited steps order and/or a specific issue order may normally be made to regulate one or more aspects of the exercise of parental responsibility, it is accepted that, where the facts of the case justify it, the court may make a combination of orders which have the effect of prohibiting a parent from taking any step in the exercise of his or her parental responsibility and clothing the other parent with the exclusive right to exercise parental responsibility without reference to any other person who holds parental responsibility (para 10)

For example, in P v D [2014] EWHC 2355 (Fam) at [109] Baker J, as he then was, noted that, in very exceptional cases, the power to grant a prohibited steps order extends to making an order prohibiting a parent from taking any steps in the exercise of his or her parental responsibility. In H v A (No 1) [2015] EWHC 58 (Fam) MacDonald J granted an order prohibiting a father from taking any steps in the exercise of his parental responsibility with respect to each of his children’ (para 11)

Section 315 of Hershman and Mcfarlane: Children Law and Practice states:

‘Where the child’s father or other parent has parental responsibility for the child by virtue of the child being born (or deemed to be born) during his or her marriage to or civil partnership with the child’s mother (or by reason of subsequent legitimation), he or she is in the same position as the child’s mother. The only exception is where paternity is disputed, and the husband is subsequently found not to be the child’s father.1

Like the mother’s parental responsibility, the parental responsibility of a father or other parent whose parental responsibility derives from a marriage or civil partnership cannot be removed by court order or by any other process, other than the removal of his or her legal status as the child’s parent through adoption or a parental order.

The court may, nevertheless, make orders to limit and circumscribe a married father or other parent’s exercise of parental responsibility where the child’s welfare requires it. In B and C (Change of Names – Parental Responsibility – Evidence) Cobb J made an order prohibiting the father from taking any steps in the exercise of any aspect of his parental responsibility in relation to either child, until each child reached the age of 18 or until further order of the court. Acknowledging that such an order was draconian and rare, the court held that it was proportionate and necessary in the circumstances of a case in which the father had abducted the children to Iran, subjected them to emotional and physical abuse there and cut off their relationship with their mother’

A Local Authority v SB & Ors concerned applications by the mother for a Declaration of Non-Parentage following DNA testing and to discharge the non-biological father’s parental responsibility for the child; the latter application to discharge parental responsibility was opposed. HHJ Case stated:

‘The issue which has been exercising my mind in respect of this application over the last two or three hearings has been whether discharge of parental responsibility is an automatic consequence of the declaration of non-parentage or whether it is a separate welfare-based decision (para 10)

This question turns on the construction of section 4 of the Children Act 1989, and in particular subsection 2A, which provides “a person who has acquired parental responsibility under subsection (1) shall cease to have that responsibility only if the court so orders (para 11)

Crucially however there are no domestic cases that counsel or I have been able to identify dealing specifically with the situation of the unmarried man who has been named on the birth certificate as a father but is subsequently found not to be such by DNA testing on the face of it this is surprising given how commonly such a situation must arise’ (para 15)

‘To my mind one of the most important factors is that a declaration of non-paternity is a declaration of biological fact rather than as declaration of a legal status’ (para 28)

‘A final point that I explored with counsel is the use of the word “person” rather than “father” in section 4(2A). This would appear to envisage a non-biological father figure, if I can put it that way, being the subject of a specific application under section 4(2A); in other words, section 4(2A) is not confined to those who are in fact biological fathers but also applies to those who have previously been presumed to be the fathers and have required parental responsibility by one of the methods set out in section 4(1). If the contrary were the case it seems to me one would have expected the draftsman to use the word “father” in section 4(2A) in the same way as occurs in section 4(1). It seems to me that the choice of wording (person) also disposes of any argument that a man such as RK (named on the birth certificate but proved by DNA testing not to be the biological father) never in fact obtained parental responsibility in the first place’ (para 33)

‘So, for all those reasons, I conclude that: 

  1. Section (2A) is the only means by which the court can consider removing parental responsibility from a father who has obtained it under section (1);
  2. That is a welfare-based decision;
  3. That the fact that the man in question has been found not to be the biological father will feed into that welfare consideration, but that the discharge of parental responsibility is not automatic. The importance of the lack of a biological link is one which will vary from case to case’ (para 35)

To further assist (albeit not binding law), an extract from The Deed Poll Office website states (https://deedpolloffice.com/change-name/children/parental-responsibility): 

  • ‘Parental responsibility is not lost solely because —
    • someone else gains parental responsibility
    • the parents (or a parent and a step-parent) get divorced, or dissolve their civil partnership
    • it’s shown that the father isn’t the biological father, for example by a DNA test report
    • the wrong father’s details are removed from the birth registration (unless done by a court order such as a Declaration of Parentage, AND the court also removes parental responsibility)

One common situation is when a child’s legal father has parental responsibility, but he isn’t the biological father.  If the mother wants to change the child’s name in this sort of case, the “wrong” father will nevertheless need to give his consent, even if his non-paternity is proven by a DNA test.  A person can only lose parental responsibility by order of the court.

Note that if the birth certificate is corrected to remove the wrong father’s details — and even if the biological father’s details are later added — the originally registered father won’t lose his parental responsibility.  It must be removed by a court.’

Discussion:

Whilst X was not Y’s biological father he had been established as Y’s ‘legal father’ by being named on Y’s birth certificate and therefore had parental responsibility. In light of the law set out above, and specifically as concluded by the court in A Local Authority v SB & Ors [2022] EWFC 111, the making of a Declaration of Non-Parentage did not automatically remove X’s parental responsibility for Y. It appears very much so that there is a ‘frozen in time’ aspect to the registration of a birth in that whilst a person may be incorrectly named as a child’s biological father (and in some cases deliberately so), correction of the birth certificate after the event of registration does not automatically remove the rights acquired by that person. 

Section 4(2A) did not apply to the circumstances of this case as X and the mother were married at the time Y was born (and when his birth was registered). If a discharge of parental responsibility is not automatic on a Declaration of Non-Parentage for a man unmarried to the mother but who is named on a birth certificate, it is difficult to comprehend that the same approach would not apply to a man married to the mother and who is also named on the birth certificate. This approach was also in line with the court’s view as set out above during the case management of Y’s proceedings.

It was considered whether section 4A of the Children Act 1986 applied to the circumstances of Y’s case. However, that section addresses the position only when a person (not a biological parent) is simply married to/in a civil partnership with the child’s biological mother; it does not relate to when that person is also named on the birth certificate. Given the ‘frozen in time’ aspect to the registration of a child’s birth, the court in Y’s proceedings could not apply section 4A retrospectively and after the event of registration. Section 4A did not apply. 

Given that the statutory provisions permitting the removal of parental responsibility by order of the court (sections 4(2A), 4ZA(5) and 4A(3) of the Children Act 1989) did not apply to Y’s proceedings, as a matter of law X retained his parental responsibility and an order could not be made to remove this save for if an adoption order was made, which was not also applicable in this case. The only order that could be made to interfere with X’s parental responsibility was the making of a Prohibited Steps Order to limit the extent to which he could exercise parental responsibility for Y; however, no application for such an order was before the court in these proceedings. No such application was made by the mother or the Guardian on the basis that, in summary, (a) X continued to have regular and extended periods of contact with Y and that it would be in Y’s best interests for X to be in a position to exercise parental responsibility at least during those periods, (b) there was no indication that X would misuse or abuse his parental responsibility, and (c) if there was an issue in the future giving rise of allegations of misuse/abuse of his parental responsibility, the mother could seek the intervention from the court.

In summary and considering the legal provisions and case law, the submissions made on behalf of Y’s Guardian for a Declaration of Non-Parentage were as follows:

  • Pursuant to section 55A(3) of the Family Law Act 1986, the Guardian had a sufficient personal interest in the determination of the application by virtue of her appointment as Y’s guardian to represent his interests, and therefore the court could hear the application
  • Pursuant to section 55A(5) of the Family Law Act 1986, the determination of the application would be in the best interests of Y. Considering the case law, it could not be suggested that this was an unusual case in which it could be said that to hear the application was not in Y’s best interests
  • The truth of the proposition that X is not Y’s biological father was proved to the satisfaction of the court and as a matter of fact due to (a) the admissions by the mother and X that he was named as Y’s father on the birth certificate when they were in full knowledge that he was not (and could not) be Y’s biological father and (b) confirmation via DNA testing that X was not Y’s biological father
  • X could not, and did not, argue against the proven fact that he was not Y’s biological father
  • Section 58 of the Family Law Act 1986 states, ‘where on an application to a court for a declaration under this Part the truth of the proposition to be declared is proved to the satisfaction of the court, the court shall make that declaration unless to do so would manifestly be contrary to public policy’
  • A birth certificate is a legal and official document of public record
  • The mother and X were intentionally dishonest when registering paternity on the birth certificate and they accepted this
  • The mother supported the Guardian’s application. She raised during safeguarding interviews that she wished for X’s name to be removed from Y’s birth certificate. She maintained this position throughout the proceedings.
  • It was important for Y’s emotional wellbeing for his birth certificate to be corrected so that he had a correct understanding of his identity and biological origins
  • Whilst it was acknowledged that X was a significant person in Y’s life, their relationship was promoted through contact pursuant to the final Child Arrangements Order
  • There were no circumstances in this case making it ‘one of those unusual cases where I should decline to make the declaration notwithstanding the compelling evidence’ (as per A Local Authority v SB & Ors [2022] EWFC 111 at para 6). There was also no evidence to support an argument that making the declaration would be ‘manifestly be contrary to public policy’

There is therefore a positive duty on the court to make a Declaration of Non-Parentage or a Declaration of Parentage, as the case may be, where the truth of the proposition declared (i.e., whether someone is or is not the child’s father) is provided to the satisfaction of the court (e.g., via DNA testing) UNLESS to do so would be manifestly contrary to public policy. Consequently, there is a very high threshold set for any argument against a Declaration of Parentage or a Declaration of Non-Parentage in cases involving, for example, DNA testing. The law is also clear that an application for a Declaration of Parentage/Non-Parentage is separate to an application for a parental responsibility order; Section 58 of the Family Law Act 1986 does not apply to applications for parental responsibility and when determining an application for parental responsibility the court will consider factors including:

  • The child’s welfare is the court’s paramount consideration
  • The welfare checklist principles
  • The degree of commitment the applicant has shown towards the child
  • The degree of attachment between the applicant and the child
  • The reasons why the applicant is applying for the order

Procedure after the making of a Declaration of Non-Parentage:

Pursuant to Rule 8.22 of the Family Procedure Rules 2010:

‘Upon the making of a declaration of parentage/non-parentage, a court officer must send a copy of a declaration of parentage and the application to the Registrar General within 21 days beginning with the date on which the declaration was made’.

Pursuant to section 14A of the Family Law Act 1986:

  1. Where, in the case of a person whose birth has been registered in England and Wales—
    1. the Registrar General receives, by virtue of section 55A(7) or 56(4) of the Family Law Act 1986, a notification of the making of a declaration of parentage in respect of that person; and
    2.  it appears to him that the birth of that person should be re–registered,

      he shall authorise the re–registration of that person’s birth, and the re–registration shall be effected in such manner and at such place as may be prescribed. 

If the court makes a Declaration of Parentage/Non-Parentage, the child’s birth may be re-registered accordingly pursuant to section 14A of the Births and Deaths Registration Act 1953. The original information will remain on the birth certificate, but a note will be added to the margin of the register/certificate to confirm the correction of information to the child’s birth father and the date of the correction.

  1. Albeit Hershman and Mcfarlane: Children Law and Practice does not go further than this and does not set out what the ‘exception’ is in law and, in any event, X was also named on the child’s birth certificate  ↩︎